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I. INTRODUCTION
O ne of the uncertainties and intrigues of the post-Cold War era is
the form international trade will take as we move toward a new
millennium. It is conceivable that the trade landscape will assume any
number of shapes in the next several years. With the emergence of the
European Community, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and
other proposed and existing trading consortia in Asia and Latin Ameri-
ca,' perhaps the world economy will become divided into regional trad-
ing blocs, where trade between countries within the various regions will
become greatly eased, but where trade between countries from different
regions will become more difficult and costly. Or, if the current Uru-
guay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") is
concluded and ratified by the signatory nations, as appears likely with
the approval of the pact by representatives of the 117 participating na-
tions on December 15, 1993,2 perhaps a true global market will flour-
ish, with lower tariffs and fewer restrictions resulting in the creation of
new jobs in both the United States and worldwide. 3 A third, extreme al-
ternative, is if advocates of more protectionist measures carry the day in
nations around the world, perhaps a retreat into a 1930s style period of
. International Trade Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C. The views expressed
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Baker & McKenzie.
' See, e.g., Asian Free Trade Should Be Goal For APEC, Australia Aide Says, J. COM.,
Mar. 30, 1993, at 4A; Kevin G. Hall, Guatemala Seeks to Follow in Mexico's Footsteps on
Trade, J. COM., Mar. 17, 1993, at IA; Richard Lawrence, U.S. Firms Eye Latin Free-Trade
Growth, J. CoM., Apr. 15, 1993, at IA.
2 Peter Behr, 117 Nations' Representatives Approve Historic Trade Pact, WASH. POsT, Dec.
16, 1993, at A41. However, before becoming effective, the Agreement must be ratified by the
U.S. Congress and other legislatures around the world.
See generally Peter Behr, With Clock Ticking, Trade Talks Head Into Final Round for
U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1993, at A16; Paul Blustien & Daniel Williams, Tokyo Talks Yield
Trade 'Breakthrough', WASH. PosT, July 8, 1993, at Al; Breakthrough on Trade, WASH. POST,
July 8, 1993, at A16.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
rising tariffs, higher prices, and decreased international trade will result.4
Regardless of the shape international trade ultimately takes, the
United States should seek to maximize its trade competitiveness by
continually reevaluating the efficacy of its various trade laws and regula-
tions. One area especially in need of reevaluation and reform by Con-
gress is the aspect of antidumping and countervailing duty law5 which
governs how antidumping proceedings shall be conducted at the Depart-
ment of Commerce International Trade Administration ("ITA"). In par-
ticular, the antidumping procedures currently in place at the ITA do not
provide the investigated parties an impartial tribunal. Due, at least in
part, to this lack of impartiality, there exists the damaging perception in
the international trade community that the ITA is unfairly biased and
overly vulnerable to political pressure.6
The perception of an ITA bias is based on a number of factors, not
the least of which is that the ITA now finds fully 97% of all foreign
companies it investigates guilty of dumping.' The fact that the ITA
virtually never absolves foreign producers of dumping allegations does
not, by itself, prove that the ITA is unfairly biased, but it does plant
more than a seed of doubt about the agency's impartiality in applying
antidumping laws.
In the bigger picture, the perception that the ITA is biased damages
the U.S. government's credibility for fairness in trade matters and, ulti-
mately, the nation's own economic interests. For example, while the
U.S. government lays much of the blame for its trade deficit with Japan
at Japan's doorstep (rightly so, given Japan's closed markets), Japan and
' Many believe that the higher tariffs and generally more restrictive trade practices enacted
in the 1930 Tariff (Smoot-Hawley) Act played a large role in the onset of the Great Depression.
See, e.g., Lou Cannon, Last Broadcast From Reagan Ranch Hails Free Trade: President Praises
Canada's Voters for Rejecting Protectionism, a "Cheap Form of Nationalism", WASH. POST,Nov.
27, 1988, at A13; Faint Hearts and Fair Traders, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1987, at 36; John G. B.
Howland, Time for NAFTA, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1993, at 14.
' Because U.S. antidumping law (in which the government determines whether foreign pro-
ducers have injured the U.S. domestic industry by selling goods in the U.S. at less-than-fair-val-
ue) and countervailing duty law (in which the government determines whether subsidies from
foreign governments to foreign producers have created an unfair advantage) are largely similar
both substantively and procedurally, this article limits 4is discussion to antidumping law. The dis-
cussion and recommendations apply equally, however, to countervailing duty law.
6 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
Some believe that the other agency responsible for administering the antidumping law, the
International Trade Commission ("ITC"), is biased as well. See James Bovard, Raiders of the
Lost Kiwis, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 1992, at G1. The perception of ITC bias, however, is much
less pervasive and engenders less antipathy than the perception of ITA bias. See infra notes 58-
59 and accompanying text.
James Bovard, Commerce's Latest Fair Trade Fraud, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A14.
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other countries use figures such as the ITA's 97% affirmative
antidumping rate to allege that the U.S. itself engages in unfair trade
practices. Indeed, in its second annual report on unfair traders, the Japa-
nese Trade Ministry ("MITI") cited the United States as one of the
world's three worst offenders,8 in large part because of the U.S.'s ad-
ministration of its antidumping laws.9
Nor is the notion of an ITA bias confined to foreign entities, such
as Japan's MITI, that have admittedly vested interests. The United States
Court of International Trade, the appellate court in most antidumping
suits, has also harshly criticized the ITA's handling of antidumping
proceedings. For example, in overruling the ITA and requiring the gov-
ernment to reimburse penalties assessed against a Japanese ball-bearing
manufacturer, Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas stated, in a June, 1993 decision,
that "Commerce [i.e. the ITA] repeatedly ignores the law and disobeys
the decisions of this court."' Regarding the ITA's propensity for using
any failure on the part of a foreign company to comply with the exact
letter of the ITA's complex and voluminous questionnaires as an excuse
to impose punitive measures," Judge R. Kenton Musgrave stated, in
another Court of International Trade case, that the ITA's "predatory
'gotcha' policy does not promote cooperation or accuracy." 2
The perception of an ITA bias extends to academics and trade
practitioners as well. According to Ronald Cass, dean of the Boston
University Law School and a former member of the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission, "[m]any people in Commerce [i.e. the ITA]
' See Paul Blustein, Japan Favors Trade Rules Over "Results": MITI Report Says U.S.
Breaks Global Standards in 9 of 12 Areas, WASH. POST, May 12, 1993, at F2. The other two
unfair traders cited were South Korea and the European Community. Id.
' Mark Magnier, U.S. High on List as Japan Issues Its Own Report on Unfair Traders, J.
COM., May 11, 1993, at 10A. The report noted that, between 1969 and June, 1992, more than
55% of the world's antidumping investigations were initiated by the United States and Australia,
and that "[w]hen abused, anti-dumping measures disrupt existing trade, distort normal commercial
practices and impose prohibitive costs on foreign companies forced to defend themselves." Id.
" Peter Passell, Tough U.S. Enforcement on Trade: Is It Fair?, N.Y. TwIES, July 20, 1993,
at DI.
" These punitive measures involve the use of the "best information otherwise available" (i.e.,
information supplied by the petitioner) in place of information supplied by the foreign producer.
See infra note 30.
2 Passell, supra note 10, at Dl.
See Thomas P. Ondeck & Michael A. Lawrence, Court of International Trade Deference to
International Trade Commission and International Trade Administration Antidumping Determina-
tions: An Empirical Look, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. (forthcoming Winter 1993-94) (discussing
the notion that the Court of International Trade may give more deference to the ITC than to the
ITA in antidumping matters).
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now see themselves as advocates for domestic business."' 3 Similarly,
James Bovard, author of a book entitled Fair Trade Fraud, contends
that "[the ITA] is on a holy crusade to find foreigners dumping" their
goods.14
When combined with the fact that the number of dumping investi-
gations worldwide is rising sharply, 5 such perceptions of an ITA bias
are especially alarming. The primary danger of these perceptions to U.S.
interests is that U.S. trading partners may retaliate and erect more oner-
ous trade barriers of their own, which, at the least, would hinder trade,
and, at the worst, could lead to retaliatory trade wars. Indeed, the
GATT's 1993 annual report warned that trade frictions between, in par-
ticular, the United States, the European Community, and Japan, when
combined with the forecast for little of no economic growth in those
countries, "could lead to an all-out trade war and wreck any hope of
concluding a successful [GATT] Uruguay Round trade liberalization
agreement."' 6 Ironically, one of the big losers in such a scenario would
be American exporters, who will suffer the effects of any retaliation by
the U.S.'s trading partners 7 - a fact that further emphasizes the short-
sightedness of ITA partisanship in antidumping matters.
This article proposes that Congress should legislate to require the
ITA to employ Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), operating under the
rubric of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),5 in antidumping
proceedings. Such legislation is needed to rehabilitate the ITA's reputa-
tion for impartiality and evenhandedness - a reputation that has eroded
in recent years to the ppint where the ITA is now widely perceived as
being patently unfair and biased in its administration of antidumping
laws. By taking such action to put its own house in order and to assure
foreign producers and governments that they will be provided impartial
hearings in U.S. antidumping disputes, Congress would send the impor-
tant message that the U.S. is willing to do its share to advance the
cause of fair trade around the world. This would represent an important
and necessary first step in easing the potential for a continuing escala-
tion of trade frictions between the U.S. and its trading partners.
*3 Passell, supra note 10, at DI, D2.
14 Id. at DI; JAMES BOVARD, FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
" According to the GATr governing body in Geneva, Switzerland, the number of dumping
investigations initiated by GATT member nations rose about 35% (from 175 to 237) in the year
ending June 30, 1992, from the corresponding period a year earlier. Dumping Investigations by
GATT on the Rise, J. COM., Apr. 30, 1993, at 4A.
16 GATT Report Warns of Total Trade War, J. COM., May 14, 1993, at 3A.
" Passell, supra note 10, at Dl, D2.
IS See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
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This article proceeds in several stages. Part II provides a back-
ground of current U.S. antidumping law and takes a brief look at some
of the constitutional issues that arise in the context of administrative
investigations and adjudications. The ITA's vulnerability to political
pressure is also discussed in Part II. Part Ill sets out the article's pro-
posal that Congress should legislate to require that the ITA employ
ALJs in antidumping proceedings, and discusses how the proposal dove-
tails with the Administrative Procedure Act. Part I also comments on
related studies and proposals for reforming antidumping procedure, and
provides examples of the use of ALJs in other administrative proceed-
ings. Finally, Part IV restates the proposal and emphasizes its symbolic
importance in sending a message to the international trade community
that the U.S. is committed to fair trade.
II. CURRENT U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. The Antidumping Statute
United States antidumping law imposes dumping duties on foreign
goods sold in the United States "at less than fair value" when a U.S.
industry is "materially injured or is threatened with material injury" by
reason of those sales. 9 Antidumping proceedings at the administrative
level are bifurcated, with two separate U.S. government entities responsi-
ble for different aspects of the inquiry: the International Trade
Administration's Import Administration ("ITA") investigates and deter-
mines whether there were sales in the U.S. at less-than-fair-value, and
the International Trade Commission ("ITC") investigates and determines
whether those sales actually caused, or threatened to cause, material
injury to U.S. industry.
An antidumping duty proceeding begins administratively when an
interested party files an antidumping petition or when the ITA deter-
mines on its own initiative that an investigation is warranted.2' The
ITA and the ITC each conduct a two-step administrative proceeding
(preliminary and final determination) lasting nine months to one year.2'
Within 45 days of the petition's filing, the ITC must issue its pre-
19 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1988).
' 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (1988). For purposes of the statute, an "interested party" would
include a domestic manufacturer; a producer or wholesaler of a like product; a labor union or
other worker group representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production or
wholesaling of a like product; or a trade association whose members manufacture, produce or
wholesale a like product in the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1988). A foreign party
cannot file an antidumping petition. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9).
22 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (preliminary determinations); 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (1988) (final de-
terminations).
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liminary determination stating whether there is a "reasonable indication"
that a domestic industry has been materially injured or threatened with
material injury by reason of the subject imports.2 The ITC preliminary
investigation includes a hearing at which the parties may present evi-
dence. The hearing is informal (i.e., not subject to the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act),' and is usually conducted by the
Commission staff, not by the commissioners themselves.24 Subsequent-
ly, the commissioners vote on the "reasonable indication" issue, with a
majority vote of the six commissioners controlling." If the ITC finds
that there is no reasonable indication of such injury, the investigation
ends and there is no antidumping violation.26
For its part, the ITA is responsible for determining the sufficiency
of the petition and whether imports are being sold in the United States
at less than a fair market value.2 ' At the preliminary stage, the ITA is-
sues detailed questionnaires to the affected foreign producers seeking
information about, for example, home market sales, sales to the United
States, and all expenses connected with those sales for a defined period
of time up to and including the month in which the petition was
filed.28 Based on the data it receives from the responses to the ques-
tionnaire, the ITA calculates a "preliminary dumping margin,"29 which
is published in the Federal Register.
Following the preliminary determination, the ITA conducts a "veri-
fication," whereby ITA employees travel to the foreign producer's home
country facilities to examine the producer's records.3" The purpose of
" 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
23 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
24 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.15, .13 (1992).
' A 3-3 split among the 6 commissioners is considered an affirmative vote, a fact which
adds to the perception that the odds are unfairly stacked against the foreign producer. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1988).
6 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).
s 19 C.F.R. § 353.31 (1993).
The ITA's preliminary determination is due within 160 days of the petition's filing. 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1).
Although the proceeding continues regardless of the ITA's preliminary determination, an
affirmative preliminary determination has an immediate impact on the foreign producer against
whom it is assessed: that is, there will be a "suspension of liquidation" of all merchandise
covered by the preliminary determination. In such cases, U.S. Customs will not make a final
determination of duty payable on entered goods covered by the suspension of liquidation until
the antidumping case is resolved. Customs will release the goods to the importer only after he
posts a bond for the possible duties payable on the goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d).
-' 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1988). If there are problems with the questionnaire response, the ITA
is authorized to use the "best information otherwise available" (BIA). 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677e(c);
[Vol. 26:001
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this procedure is to verify the accuracy of the facts and figures that had
been submitted to the ITA in the producer's questionnaire response. Af-
ter the verification, the ITA issues its final determination."
The final step in the antidumping proceeding at the administrative
level is the ITC's final injury determination.32 The final determinations
of both the ITA and the ITC must be affirmative in order for there to
be an antidumping violation and the resulting imposition of an
antidumping duty order requiring the assessment of dumping duties.33
19 C.F.R. § 353.37 (1993). The ITA uses such information, which usually consists merely of
information contained in the petitioner's allegations (which is naturally bound to be damaging to
the foreign producer), on the theory that if the actual facts were better than the allegations, the
foreign producer would have submitted those facts. Because the use of the "best information
available" can have disastrous results for the foreign producer, the ITA can - and does - use
its power and leverage to compel full compliance with its questionnaires and deadlines.
Despite strictures against applying BIA too freely, see, e.g., Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v.
United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he ITA has not been given power
[under the BIA statute] that can be 'wielded' arbitrarily as an 'informal club'[.]"), the ITA has
in fact applied BIA more aggressively in recent years. For example, in one recent case, after a
German steel company provided massive data on its German and U.S. sales in response to ITA
questionnaires, the ITA requested further highly detailed information on sales in Germany of a
type of steel not even exported to the U.S. Then, as reported by the Wall Street Journal: "On
December 15, Commerce [the ITA] decided to impose BIA penalties on the German company if
it did not furnish all information on all sales by December 21 - but did not inform the
company of that ultimatum until January 7." Bovard, supra note 7, at A14. Such actions have
become the all-too-usual modus operandi at the ITA, a fact that fuels the perception that the
agency is unfair and biased.
3" Barring an extension of the statutory deadline for "extraordinarily complicated" cases, 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(c), the ITA must issue its final dumping determination within 75 days after the
date of its preliminary determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1).
2 The ITC's final injury determination is due 120 days after an affirmative ITA preliminary
determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(2).
' 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Absent good cause shown, the antidumping duty order cannot be
revoked for at least two years after its imposition. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(2) (1988).
While the ITA's preliminary and final determinations set the amount of estimated duties,
actual dumping duties are calculated by the ITA in an "annual administrative review." See 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1988). In such a review, the ITA sends a questionnaire to the foreign produc-
er similar to that sent during the initial investigation in order to solicit sales information for U.S.
and home-market sales for the particular period covered. To the extent that the actual dumping
duty calculated in the review differs from the estimated duty deposit collected pursuant to the
antidumping duty order, the difference is refunded or charged to the importer. See 19 U.S.C. §
1673f (1988).
In the event an annual administrative review for a given period is not requested, the
Customs Service simply keeps the duty deposits, treating them as though they are the actual
dumping duties due. Producers that receive high dumping margins in an investigation very often
take advantage of the annual reviews to attempt to get their dumping duty rates revised. If, for
example, a company is able to reduce a dumping rate from 20% to 1% or zero in an
antidumping review, the antidumping duty order will be an irritant, but not necessarily a barrier,
to its making sales to the United States.
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B. The ITA's and ITC's Dual Role in Antidumping Proceedings
1. Investigative and/or Adjudicative?
Implied in the foregoing description of the antidumping statutes is
the notion that the ITA and ITC perform several different functions in
antidumping proceedings. As noted by Professors John H. Jackson of the
University of Michigan and William J. Davey of the University of Illi-
nois in a 1991 report prepared at the request of the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States:' "[U]nder the relevant statutes, as inter-
preted by the courts, the [antidumping] process is primarily an investiga-
tive one, although there are clearly aspects of the process that resemble
an adjudication .. . . [The process is] sufficiently adjudicative such that
meaningful hearings with appropriate procedural protections should be
held by the agencies."35 In some circumstances, the ITA performs as
the prosecutor of the investigation, as well36 - a situation that places
the foreign producers in the unenviable and ultimately untenable position
of having to rebut and counter the ITA in its prosecutorial role while
being careful not to alienate or anger the ITA in its judge and jury
roles.
3' The Administrative Conference is an independent federal agency that conducts research,
issues reports, and makes recommendations to the President, Congress, particular departments and
agencies, and the judiciary concerning the need for procedural reforms in federal agencies.
Conference recommendations may be implemented directly by the affected agencies or through
legislative action.
The Administrative Conference is due for congressional reauthorization in 1994, and, al-
though the Conference enjoys the strong support of bar associations and several congressional
committees, the House Appropriations subcommittee, in a controversial step, eliminated all
funding for the Conference in 1993. Dry Subject, Hot Fight, WASH. POST, July 17, 1993, at A16.
- JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REFORM OF THE ADMINISTIATIVE PROCEDURES USED IN U.S. ANT!DUMPING AND CouNrERvAILINO
DUTY CASES 30-31 (1991)[hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY REPORTI(on file at the Administrative
Conference of the United States).
Professors Jackson and Davey found, by contrast, that officials at the ITA and ITC believe
that antidumping proceedings are and should be solely investigative, where "those investigat-
ed ... speak only when spoken to." Id. at 31.
As discussed supra note 20 and accompanying text, the ITA may initiate an antidumping
investigation on its own. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(l) (1988) ("An antidumping investigation shall be
commenced whenever the ... [ITA] determines, from information available to it, that a formal
investigation is warranted. ... ). In such cases the ITA clearly prosecutes the case. Some
would argue that the ITA's bias in favor of domestic producers in effect makes the ITA the de
facto prosecutor even in those cases where the petition is submitted by an outside party.
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2. Constitutional Issues
The question of what functions the ITA and ITC assume in
antidumping proceedings is more than academic. Separation of functions
at the agency level is an issue that has long been debated and litigated,
for agencies typically perform many functions, including policymaking,
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of disputes.37 The inherent
tension that exists between agencies' sometimes conflicting roles "can
result in a lack of confidence on the part of the public in the process
instituted by the agency, which may rise to constitutional dimen-
sions."38 In the antidumping context, while the combination of functions
in ITA and ITC procedures creates serious problems which must be
addressed, the courts would find, probably, that the problems do not rise
to constitutional dimensions.39
One common theme that has emerged from the case law, however,
is that due process considerations require at least some degree of sepa-
ration of functions in administrative proceedings. In particular, due pro-
cess requires a neutral, unbiased adjudicatory decisionmaker. ° The
a PAUL VERKUIL Er AL, ADmINISTRATIVE CONIERENCE OF TE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE JUDICIARY 128 (1992) [hereinafter FEDERAL ADMINISmTRTvE JUDICIARY] (citing, e.g., INTERSTATE
COmmERCE COMMISSION, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1971) (issued by the Ash Council, George M. Stafford, Chairman) (urging reassignment of
adjudicatory functions from agencies to an administrative court); PRESIDENT'S COMMITITEE ON
AD1TXI1VE MANAGEAMEN, ADmINISIRA'IvE MANAGEMENt IN TE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITE) STATES
(1937) (urging that no agency be given both adjudicative and prosecutorial responsibilities)).
' John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALI Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44
ADMIN. L. REv. 261, 265 (1992) [hereinafter Frye Report].
"9 In Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), the Supreme Court upheld as constitutionally
permissible an Immigration Act statute explicitly authorizing an adjudicatory decisionmaking
structure in which the hearing officer reports to officials with enforcement responsibility. See also
Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955). More recently, in Richard-
son v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971), the Court upheld an adjudicatory system in which the
individuals responsible for conducting the adjudication also participated in the investigation. See
generally FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 130-31.
In short, regulatory proceedings do not require the same strict separation of functions that is
present in, for example, criminal proceedings in which the various functions are assigned to
different institutions (i.e., the policymaking function is assigned to the legislature, the investiga-
tive function is assigned to the police, prosecution is assigned to the district attorney, and
adjudication is assigned to the courts). Id. at 128.
o "Scholars and judges consistently characterize provision of a neutral decisionmaker as one
of the three or four core requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decisionmaking." FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 124 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 171
(1974) (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedure, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976)).
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APA squarely addresses this issue by requiring in section 554(d) that the
decisionmaker in the adjudication function possess a measure of inde-
pendence from agency influence; 4' however, the APA applies only to
formal proceedings.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. LTV Corp.,43 absent due process considerations, an agency in an
informal adjudication is not required to provide the trial-like procedures
of a formal adjudication set out in sections 554, 556, and 557 of the
APA." Rather, the minimum requirements for "informal" adjudications
and proceedings are those described in section 555 of the APA4' (e.g.,
the right to appear, to be represented, to be entitled to a decision in a
reasonable time, to have a copy of the transcript or other record, to
subpoenas otherwise authorized by law, and to notice of and a statement
of reasons for an adverse decision).
One might conclude from the Court's language in Pension Benefit
that impartial tribunals are not required in informal adjudications such as
antidumping proceedings. However, the Court's failure to mention sec-
tion 554's impartial tribunal provisions should not be interpreted to
imply that informal adjudications do not require impartial tribunals. It
would be highly surprising for the Court to require impartial tribunals in
formal adjudications on the one hand, while allowing "not-impartial"
(i.e., biased) tribunals in informal adjudications on the other hand. If
Section 554 of the APA states:
(d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence [e.g., the
ALJ] . . . may not-
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or pros-
ecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or
agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988).
42 "Formal" adjudications are those that are required to use an Administrative Law Judge
("AL") pursuant to the APA's "on the record" hearing requirements. See infra notes 76-82 and
accompanying text. Antidumping proceedings in the ITA and ITC, by contrast, are "informal."
"Informal" adjudications are those that are not required to use an ALJ pursuant to the APA
requirements. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
41 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
' Id. at 655-56. Pension Benefit and the cases noted supra note 39 "make clear that these
unusually powerful safeguards of decisional independence [required by the APA for formal
adjudications] are not required by due process" for informal adjudications. FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 131.
"s Pension Benefit, 496 U.S. at 655.
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such were the case, the very foundation upon which the U.S. legal sys-
tem is based - i.e., the impartial weighing of facts and even-handed
application of law regardless of the circumstances of individual cases -
would be breached.
C. Effect of Politics on ITA and ITC Antidumping Investigations
1. Vulnerability of ITA and ITA to Political Pressure
To see how politics can influence the ITA's and ITC's antidumping
decisionmaking, it is necessary to understand in general terms how the
two entities are staffed and structured. The ITA is a typical executive
branch agency, with several layers of civil servants reporting to upper
management consisting of presidential political appointees. Specifically,
the ITA operates with a total of about 220 case analysts and 15 pro-
gram managers in the Office of Investigations and Office of Compli-
ance,46 two Division Directors in each office, one Office Director in
each office, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Compliance and a Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Investigations, and finally, the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Import Administration. 7  The ITC, by contrast, is
composed of six commissioners appointed to fixed nine-year terms by
the President. Not more than three of the commissioners may be of the
same political party. 8 Besides the commissioners, the ITC consists of a
staff of commodity specialists, accountants, economists, and attorneys
who gather relevant facts and prepare reports for the commissioners' use
in their decisionmaking.49 The commissioners review the evidence and
reports prepared by the staff and hear whatever questions and views are
' The Office of Investigations is responsible for conducting antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations. The Office of Compliance is responsible for ensuring that antidumping and
countervailing duty orders are properly administered and for conducting administrative reviews.
THOMAS V. VAKERICS Er AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND OTHER TRADE AC-
TIONS 4-5 (1987).
4 The deputy assistant secretaries and the assistant secretary are political appointees.
Typically, once the ITA investigative team (the composition of an investigative team varies
by case, but might typically consist of two case analysts, one program manager, and one division
director) makes its determination after completing its antidumping investigation or review, the
determination is reviewed in turn through the various levels of the ITA hierarchy. Some in the
trade bar believe that ITA case analysts, "who must shoulder the bulk of the investigative bur-
den, are often ill-trained and stay too short a time in their positions . . . . As a result, impor-
tant decisions are in fact made at only one of the many review levels, causing delay and
redundant analysis." Peter 0. Suchman, A Cost-Benefit Examination of Trade Cases in an Era of
Austerity: An Outline of the Problem and Some Suggestions 5 (Oct. 28, 1992) (on file with
United States Court of International Trade).
' 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988).
'9 VAKERICS ET AL., supra note 46, at 7.
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expressed by the other commissioners, but each commissioner ultimately
makes his or her own specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
independently of the other five.5"
For a number of reasons, many believe that the ITA and ITC are
overly vulnerable to political pressure in administering the antidumping
laws. As stated by Professors Jackson and Davey in their 1991 report to
the Administrative Conference:
Since the Assistant Secretary at the ITA and the Commissioners at the
ITC are presidential appointees, confirmed by the Senate .... [the
concern is] that these individuals might tilt their [antidumping] deci-
sions in favor of domestic industry because of their connection with
the political process. Moreover, lower echelon employees might act to
favor domestic interests on the belief that such favoritism would be
noticed by their superiors and redound to the benefit of their careers
over the long run.51
The ITA is viewed by many as being especially vulnerable to polit-
ical pressure.52 Indeed, some members of Congress actively seek to
influence the ITA's day-to-day decisionmaking. In particular, Senator
Ernest F. Hollings, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, is
considered to be "an 800-pound tiger out there making sure the dump-
ing laws are enforced," according to a spokesman for the senator.53
The degree to which many in the international trade community
believe that the ITA is biased in its administration of antidumping laws
is demonstrated by the actions and comments of officials involved in
various trade matters. For example, a major reason for the Canadian
government's insistence that a binational panel review process be includ-
ed in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes under the U.S.-Cana-
da Free Trade Agreement 4 was the belief that the ITA's decisions are
biased and politically motivated. As stated by Canadian International
Trade Minister Pat Carney during the Agreement's negotiations in 1987:
"We want impartial mechanisms. For example, if the U.S. alleges that
our stumpage programs are subsidies, we want an impartial, binational
5o See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979).
SI JACKSON & DAVEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 34.
52 Id. at 34. See, e.g., Joseph A. Vicario, Jr., The Anatomy of Antidumping Proceeding: A
Case Study of the Antifriction Bearings Investigations, 15 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 249.
265 (1990) ("The opinion held by many [is] that the [ITA's] administration of the antidumping
law is politically sensitive with domestic industries and their congressional supporters.").
3 Passell, supra note 10, at DI, D2.
54 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988. Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (amended 1989, 1990).
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tribunal to deal with the issue, not the U.S. Department of Com-
merce."55 More recently, after wrangling with the ITA for months over
imports of live pigs from Canada, the special binational committee com-
mented in October, 1992, that the ITA "failed to conform to the express
holding and reasoning of this panel," and accordingly dismissed the
ITA's judgment against the Canadians. 6
Similarly, a 1991 Journal of Commerce article reported: "The in-
vestigation [of flat panel display screens from Japan] has become so
politically charged that some, including House Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt, D-Mo., are worried the outcome is already 'fixed' and could
have nothing to do with the department's actual findings."'57
Such comments indicate that there has developed a serious erosion
of the trade community's confidence in the ITA's ability to render im-
partial and evenhanded antidumping decisions. This perception of bias in
an administrative proceeding runs counter to the image of fairness and
impartiality that the U.S. government seeks to project in any forum
informal or formal.
The ITC, on the other hand, with its quasi-judicial procedure and
greater independence from the political branches of government, 8 is
less susceptible to political pressure than the ITA in rendering its
antidumping injury determinations. As stated in a paper presented at the
1992 Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade:
If such determinations were made by an Executive Branch
" Protection from U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws Prime Goal of FTA Talks, Mulroney Says,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4-11, at 368, 369 (Mar. 18, 1987).
Passell, supra note 10, at D1.
s' Valerie Rice, U.S. Probe of Japanese Screen Sales Splits Industry, J. COM., July 5, 1991,
at IA.
Further fueling the perception that the ITA is particularly vulnerable to political pressure is
the fact that part of the ITA's stated mission is to "participate[] in formulating U.S. foreign
trade and economic policies, working with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other
agencies . . . " U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1992). See also, James A.
Toupin, Siblings Before the Bench: The International Trade Commission and the Department of
Commerce Before the Court of International Trade 2 (Oct. 28, 1992) (on file with United States
Court of International Trade). The existence of a policy function within the ITA by itself is not
a problem - as noted supra note 37 and accompanying text, it is not unusual for agencies to
be responsible for a number of functions, including policymaking. The problem is that the ITA
decisionmakers, who both investigate and adjudicate antidumping disputes, are not adequately
insulated from the inappropriate influence of those with other responsibilities (including
policymaking) within the agency - a fact that contributes to the perception that the ITA
decisionmakers are overly vulnerable to political pressure.
' Once appointed, the ITC Commissioners do not answer to the President. The ITC itself is
an independent agency, while the Department of Commerce (and hence, the ITA) is an executive
department.
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decisionmaker, decisions about whether an industry was injured by
reason of imports would be in danger of being perceived as decisions
on whether the Executive regarded a specific industry as worthy of
protection. The Commission scheme isolates injury determination from
this perception of political considerations.59
Because the great majority of the complaints of bias involve the ITA
and not the ITC, this article asserts that the proceedings currently in
place at the ITC do an adequate job of providing an impartial tribunal
in antidumping disputes, and accordingly limits its reform proposal to
the proceedings at the ITA.
2. U.S. Trade Policy
The political pressures upon the agencies responsible for administer-
ing the U.S. trade laws have, if anything, intensified under the Clinton
Administration. The Administration has rattled its trade saber on a num-
ber of occasions in its first year in office. For example, when United
States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor made his first visit to Brus-
sels to meet with European Community officials in early April, 1993, he
delivered the blunt and uncompromising message that the United States
market is open, while the EC market is closed, and that the U.S. would
aggressively work to change this fact.' In anticipation of Japanese
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's visit to Washington in mid-June,
1993, Administration officials delivered a similarly tough message when
it called on Japan to dramatically reduce its huge worldwide trade sur-
plus over the next several years or otherwise face increasingly severe
economic pressures around the world.6 Finally, the administration
moved quickly in its first months in office to reclassify imported
minivans as trucks, thus raising import tariffs on these primarily Jap-
anese vehicles from 2.5% to 25%, despite the assessment of some gov-
ernment trade attorneys that such a change in classification would proba-
bly violate international trade rules against raising tariffs.62
Toupin, supra note 57, at 2-3.
W Keith M. Rockwell, Mr. Kantor Comes to Europe, J. COM., Apr. 6, 1993, at 8A.
6' Peter Behr, Japan Urged to Slash Trade Surplus, WASH. POST, June 8, 1993, at Al.
Japan's worldwide trade surplus in 1992 was $132 billion, $50 billion of which is attributable to
the United States. See also Mark Magnier, Clinton Impatient Over Barriers, Brown Tells Japan,
J. COM., Apr. 26, 1993, at IA.
' John Maggs, U.S. Moves Quickly to Raise Imported Minivan Tariffs, J. CoM., Apr. 26,
1993, at 3A. President Clinton stated at a March 23, 1993, press conference that "I was aston-
ished that the Bush administration overruled its own customs office and gave a $300-million-a-
year freebie to the Japanese for no apparent reason. And we got nothing - and, I emphasize,
nothing - in return." Id.
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It is an open question whether government should aggressively
intervene in markets. The literature is replete with articles and books
advocating the virtues of policies running the gamut from protectionism
and "managed trade"63 to laissez-faire free trade.' Certainly the Presi-
dent has the right, and responsibility, to formulate and present a cogent
trade policy to Congress, and the legislation that ultimately emerges may
well involve "protectionist" elements.6' While some may (and frequent-
ly do) quarrel with the advisability and fairness of the substance of such
legislation, as long as it provides for the objective and impartial investi-
gation and adjudication of disputes that arise in connection with the
statutes, the procedure is sound.
By contrast, administrative procedures, such as those practiced by
the ITA in antidumping disputes, in which the decisionmakers are inap-
propriately vulnerable to outside influences - thereby increasing the
risk that the decisions will be skewed in favor of those outside influenc
es - do damage to the concept of the impartial and evenhanded admin-
61 See, e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1993). Ms. Tyson, describing herself as a "cautious activist," advocates
three forms of government action to assist domestic high-technology industries:
first, selective subsidies; second, the use of "aggressive unilateralism" in the
form of threats to close our markets and to pry open foreign markets that
we unilaterally judge to be closed to us unfairly; and third, a resort to
"managed trade," which economists define as the setting of restrictive quotas
on imports and targets to expand exports.
Jagdish Bhagwati, Rough Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 31, 1993, at 35 (book review). Ms.
Tyson's views are particularly worthy of note, since she is the chief of President Clinton's
Council of Economie Advisors and as such has the access and standing to present her ideas di-
rectly to the President. Id.
"4 See, e.g., FREE TRADE DEBATE: REPORTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE (1989).
' For example, in the antidumping duty context, Congress made certain sections of the
antidumping statute significantly more onerous for foreign producers in the Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984. In the 1984 Act, Congress revised the statute governing the International Trade
Commission's investigation of whether imports from a particular country materially injure the
United States industry, requiring that henceforth it would be mandatory for the ITC to cumula-
tively assess the effects of imports from that country together with imports from other countries
of like competing products. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Previously, the
ITC had been allowed to decide whether to cumulate imports on a case-by-case basis.
Mandatory cumulation stiffened the antidumping law considerably, creating a presumption
that goods from a certain country - although when considered by themselves might create zero
impact on the domestic U.S. industry - were in fact causing material injury to the U.S. domes-
tic industry. Realizing that the statute as enacted in the 1984 legislation was too broad and went
too far in penalizing imports, Congress created an escape from mandatory cumulation in the
1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act "in any case in which the Commission determines that
imports of merchandise subject to investigation are negligible and have no discernable adverse
impact on the domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(v) (1988) (emphasis added).
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istration of justice. Taking the point a step further, even if the process is
in fact perfectly objective, if the public commonly perceives that the
proceedings are unfair and biased, the concept of evenhanded, impartial
justice is damaged, which in turn hinders the ITA's ability to perform
its job effectively.
I. A PROPOSAL TO ADD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES TO ITA
ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS
This article proposes that Congress should legislate that the ITA be
required to employ Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"),a operating
under the rubric of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), in
antidumping proceedings in order to provide the impartial tribunal that is
presently lacking. In the absence of explicit congressional action, the
ITA should recognize that its credibility for fairness currently suffers
from damaging perceptions of bias, and move to incorporate ALJs into
the process on its own. The interests at stake in antidumping cases
simply have become too great67 to leave the process as it presently
exists. Were the ITA to employ ALJs, with their independence from
agency influence and their quasi-judicial, impartial role in the proceed-
ings, the agency would effectively nullify, in a single stroke, the percep-
tion that it is unfairly biased and overly vulnerable to political pres-
sure' in antidumping proceedings.69
It must be acknowledged, given past Congressional inaction in the
"formal vs. informal adjudication" area, that this proposal faces an uphill
battle. Since the APA's enactment in 1946, "Congress has not added
significantly to those agency statutes that require 'on the record' hear-
ings even though that invitation to the expanded use of ALJs was the
basic premise of the APA."7 Furthermore, whether the ITA would vol-
'6 The APA describes the circumstances under which ALJs are utilized. See supra notes 76-
82 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
" The matter of cost for this proposal is covered in JACKSON & DAVEY REPORT, supra
note 35, at 42. Professors Jackson and Davey suggest that the added cost required for employing
ALJs could be at least partially offset by revising the chain of judicial review of antidumping
cases to make the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit the court of first review. This would
reduce the budget for the Court of International Trade, which is presently the court of first
review for antidumping cases. Generally stated, the justification for such a change lies in the
idea that federal administrative agency actions are usually reviewed in the federal courts of ap-
peal, not in trial level courts. Recommendation, 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1991). This change would
also be in accord with the Administrative Conference's general recommendation on appellate
review of administrative action. Id. A full discussion of this issue can be found in JACKSON &
DAVEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 47-48.
7' FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 10.
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untarily give up any amount of control or influence over its antidumping
domain in the absence of Congressional legislation is questionable. The
ITA is part and parcel of a vast federal bureaucracy that is by its very
nature resistant to change, and it is quite possible that the ITA would
view a self-initiated move to install ALJs in the antidumping process as
"giving away the store."
Such skepticism, however, may be unwarranted. Some agencies
have instituted the formal APA-style hearing process despite the lack of
a statutory mandate. Congress, in turn, has accepted such use of ALJs,
which has "vastly enhanced their number and influence.""' For exam-
ple, the Social Security Administration has used ALJs in its disability
determinations for many years, even though there is no statutory on-the-
record hearing requirement in that context.72 Furthermore, the ITA can
take comfort in the fact that the APA model ensures that the agency
retains ultimate control over the outcome of the proceedings over which
the ALJ presides.' The AL's decision becomes the agency's decision
only at the agency's pleasure: that is, the agency has the absolute right
to review and amend the AL's decision within a certain time period.'
In effect, "[t]he ALJ is independent during the course of the decision
process, but once a decision is made it is not granted the respect of
automatic finality or even deference."'75
A. Bases for the Proposal
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative law judges came into being with the enactment of
the APA76 in 1946. The purpose of the APA was to provide the frame-
7' Id. at 10 n.65.
7 Id. at 9.
73 Section 557 of the APA states that "[o]n appeal from or review of the initial decision [by
the ALl], the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial deci-
sion ..."' 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
7' "When the presiding employee [i.e., the ALJ] makes an initial decision, that decision then
becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or
review on motion of, the agency within the time provided by rule." Id.
In practice, in some agencies
very few initial decisions become final in this manner because most deci-
sions are reviewed by the agency. In other agencies, particularly those with
large caseloads, a high proportion of initial decisions become final in this
manner because no party appeals and the agency lacks the resources to
review all initial decisions on its own motion.
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 165.
" FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 11.
7' Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (repealed 1966);
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work for administrative agencies' adherence to certain broad guidelines
in their various rulemaking, adjudication and other proceedings. Accord-
ingly, the APA "intended to leave the decision to employ ALJs to agen-
cy-specific legislation by stating that ALJs would only be required
where statutes called for 'on the record' hearings.""
Congress' underlying intent in creating the ALJ position was to
ensure that the persons presiding over administrative proceedings "would
perform their evidentiary factfinding function free from agency coercion
or influence.""8 To that end, the APA specifically forbids presiding
ALJs from being subject to the direction or control of the individuals
who are in charge of the investigation or prosecution of that case.79
A matter before an ALJ proceeds essentially like a trial before a
court. The ALJ presides over an evidentiary hearing where both parties
present their cases in which witnesses appear and are cross-examined.
As previously noted,"0 the AL's ultimate control over the case after it
is concluded is limited, however, by the APA provision which allows an
appeal to the agency (or for the agency's self-initiated review) for its de
novo consideration of the AL's decision.8 ' In its entirety, the ALJ
procedural format serves several important functions:
[The format] ensures that the evidentiary facts will be found in the
first instance by an official not subject to the agency's control. At the
same time, the format ensures that the agency retains full power over
policy, a power it can exercise when it performs its reviewing func-
tion. Thus, policy responsibility remains exclusively with the agency
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, §§ 701-706, § 1305, § 3105, § 3344, § 5372, § 7521.)
The APA in 1946 used the title "hearing examiner" for the position now known as admin-
istrative law judge. ALJs came to be known by their present title after the Civil Service Com-
mission changed the title of hearing examiner to administrative law judge in 1972, see 37 Fed.
Reg. 16,787 (1972), and when Congress established the new title by statute in 1978. Administra-
tive Law Judges - Civil Service, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978).
'n FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 8. For example, the ITC must
use ALJs in section 337 unfair trade cases: "Each determination . . . shall be made on the re-
cord after notice and opportunity for a hearing . 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988) (emphasis
added).
7' FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 16.
79 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988). Furthermore, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) over-
sees the appointment of ALJs through a process overtly designed (i) to exclude politics from
appointment decisions and (ii) to obtain the most qualified persons. Finally, the agencies have no
control over ALU compensation, and ALJs must receive a hearing before the Merit Systems
Protection Board before they may be dismissed for cause. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY,
supra note 37, at 13.
' See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
81 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
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while the public has assurance the facts are found in the first instance
by an official not subject to agency coercion.'
Antidumping proceedings conducted by the ITA and ITC are not
required by statute to comply with the APA,"3 and the agencies have
not instituted formal ALJ processes on their own. As stated in the legis-
lative history to the 1979 Trade Agreements Act: "[While the] hearings
in antidumping duty investigations . . . are not subject to the provisions
of Title 5 of the United States Code relating to adjudicative hearings,
they must be conducted in a manner designed to permit full presentation
of information and views. '' 4
Judging from this language, Congress appears to have based its
decision that antidumping proceedings need not comply with the require-
ments of the APA at least in part on its characterization of such pro-
ceedings as solely investigative, while the APA provisions relate to
adjudications. As suggested by Professors Jackson and Davey in their
report to the United States Administrative Conference, however:
[E]ven as presently structured, the government's role [in antidumping
proceedings] is not only investigative; it also has an adjudicative as-
pect. It considers the evidence and the arguments of the parties and
decides whether injurious dumping . . . has occurred .... [I]t is not
necessary to believe that these proceedings are solely adjudicative...
to conclude that they are sufficiently adjudicative such that meaningful
hearings with appropriate procedural protections should be held by the
agencies."
Similarly, the Administrative Conference noted in a December,
1991 recommendation that:
given the conflicting positions of the parties before the agencies [in
antidumping proceedings] - the domestic industry versus the foreign
exporters -... the parties do and should play an important part in
the process. That part could be made more useful if hearings at which
the factual submissions of the two sides are tested could be conducted
more effectively than at present. 6
'2 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 16.
83 "The [antidumping investigation] hearing shall not be subject to the provisions of ... [5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) or to 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988)]." 19 U.S.C. § 1677c
(1988).
u S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381,
483 (emphasis added).
as JACKSON & DAvEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 31 (emphasis added).
'S Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,145 (1991).
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Under this rationale, antidumping proceedings are sufficiently "adju-
dicative" to be covered by the APA. In any event, the time has come
for Congress to act on this matter. Perceptions in the trade community
that the ITA does not administer U.S. antidumping laws impartially have
become sufficiently serious in recent years to warrant Congress stepping
in with legislation requiring the use of ALJs in the ITA's antidumping
proceedings.
2. The Jackson & Davey Report to the Administrative Conference
The idea for using ALJs in antidumping proceedings is not new. In
their 1991 report to the Administrative Conference, Professors Jackson
and Davey conducted a thorough review of the current antidumping
statutes and recommended certain procedural reforms. One of their con-
clusions was that APA-style hearing procedures, complete with ALJs,
should be implemented in order to improve the process in antidumping
cases.
87
Professors Jackson and Davey base their conclusions on a number
of factors. First, they point out that "use [in the ITA] of an ALJ would
mean that those persons in the agency who are charged with investigat-
ing [antidumping] matters would not be the same ones who decide the
issues raised by the investigation .... [U]se of ALJs in [antidumping]
cases would likely reduce, and perhaps even eliminate, perceptions of
partiality."88 Second, they conclude that "the issues in an [antidumping]
proceeding are the sort of issues that are appropriately considered in a
trial-type hearing by an ALJ." 9 In particular, an antidumping case in-
volves parties offering competing versions of the facts and how the rules
should be applied to those facts. An ALJ would resolve these factual
and legal disputes, much like a judge would do in a trial."' Third,
while inserting ALJs into the antidumping process would add one to
two months to the length of antidumping proceedings, Professors Jack-
son and Davey propose that the time saved by implementing an alter-
nately proposed reform9' would, in the end, more than make up for the
" JACKSON & DAVEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 43-44. The report concluded that "the
benefits of the use of ALJs to the parties outweigh the costs to the parties, once the system is
operational. As to the government, the increased costs of ALJs to the agencies would be largely
offset by cost savings obtained from [other specific reforms]." Id. at 44. See supra note 69.
's JACKSON & DAVEY REPORT, sutpra note 35, at 39.
8 Id.
90 Id.
9 The alternate reform involves bypassing the Court of International Trade in the appeal
process. See supra note 69.
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time added at the ITA stage.92 In sum:
The use of ALJs would improve the hearing process at the . . . ITA.
It would also solve some of the other problems that parties now en-
counter in dealing with the ITA, such as surprise changes in method-
ology, and offer the potential of solving other problems, such as incon-
sistencies in ITA practices. It would likely reduce perceptions of bias
or differential treatment at the hearing stage, because ALJs, like federal
judges, are insulated from informal contacts by parties or their attor-
neys and from political pressures while the current decisionmakers in
the ITA are not .... Finally, it is arguable that the ALJs over time
would render better initial decisions, which might in the long run re-
duce the number of appeals.93
Subsequent to Professors Jackson and Davey submitting their report
to the Administrative Conference in November, 1991, the Conference
itself released its Final Recommendations on Administrative Procedures
Used in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases in December,
1991.' The Conference acknowledged that the conflicting positions of
the parties coming before the agencies in antidumping proceedings sug-
gested that the process was more than merely investigative, and conclud-
ed that the hearings could be conducted more effectively than at pres-
ent." However, the Conference stopped short of including in its recom-
mendations the Jackson & Davey Report's suggestion to implement the
use of ALJs. Instead, the Conference merely suggested that "the hearing
conducted by the ITA at the end of its investigation should be presided
over by a senior official, with adequate staff support, who is knowledge-
JACKSON & DAVEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 41-42.
9 Id. at 43.
Regarding the logistics of implementing ALJs into the ITA's antidumping process, Pro-
fessors Jackson and Davey propose that ALJs be inserted into the proceedings at one of two
points: either "at the very beginning of the case or following the ITA's preliminary determina-
tion." Id. at 36. Because the disruptive effects of preliminary determinations are only temporary
(i.e., since the final determination is normally made within 135 days after the preliminary deter-
mination, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(a), 1673d(a) (1988)), and because the ALJ's role would be unclear
and likely time-consuming in the preliminary stages of an investigation, Professors Jackson and
Davey conclude that the most appropriate time for the ALl's insertion into the process would be
after the preliminary determination.
Under such a formulation, the parties would be notified of the assignment of an ALU to
their case after the preliminary investigation is completed. From that point forward, the ALT
would assume the role analogous to that of a trial judge in a litigation: that is, the ALJ would
establish ground rules, rule on any procedural questions the parties might have, and preside over
an evidentiary hearing where both parties put on their cases and examine/cross-examine witnesses.
' Recommendation, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,144 (1991).
id.
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able about the contested issues in the proceeding and who actively par-
ticipates in interchanges with counsel for the parties. 96
This vague recommendation does nothing to address the problem of
bias and certainly does not go far enough in providing an impartial
tribunal to the parties in antidumping proceedings. The bottom line is
that the individuals in the ITA responsible for investigating and deciding
whether dumping exists and, if so, what dumping margins shall issue,
are overly vulnerable to agency influence and political pressure. Further-
more, even if implemented, the Conference's recommendation would do
nothing to change the perception that the ITA is biased and unfair. This
perception will persist until truly impartial tribunals, such as those that
are offered by APA-style proceedings, complete with ALJs, are required
in antidumping proceedings.
C. ALJs in Other Administrative Proceedings
1. The ALJ/AJ Distinction
ALJs are used in a number of other administrative agency proceed-
ings; in fact, thirty agencies employ over 1,000 ALJs. 9 In addition to
ALJs, many agencies employ non-ALJs ("AJs")," who operate in a
broad range of cases from very informal to formal. The Frye Report
summarizes the distinction between ALJs and AJs: "[W]hereas the ALJs
as a group rival the federal trial judiciary and adjuncts in number and
compensation, there is another group almost twice the size [i.e., number-
ing over 2,600] of the ALJ corps that decides more cases, but does so
with less prestige, compensation and job security."" As far as what
types of cases AJs decide versus what types ALJs decide, there appears
to be no discernable pattern: "While it might be argued that the more
independent and better-compensated ALJs should be reserved for the
cases that implicate more substantial individual interests, in practice this
does not necessarily occur."'
The relevance of the ALJ/AJ distinction in the antidumping context
is the striking fact that the decisionmaker in the ITA does not even rise
to the level of an "AJ" in terms of independence and freedom from
96 Id. at 67,146.
9' Frye Report, supra note 38, at 263.
'8 The Federal Administrative Judiciary report coined the term "administrative judge," or
"AJ," to refer to those individuals who are not ALJs but who still "actually preside at some
kind of hearing, whether formal or informal." FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note
37, at 3-5.
9' Id. at 7 (citing Frye Report).
"o Id. at 4.
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agency influence.101 Rather, the ITA's dumping determination is made
by the same committee of individuals who conduct the investigation and
who are not insulated in any way from the influence of their politically-
appointed superiors or from others within the agency.
2. ALJs in the National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relation Board ("NLRB") uses ALJs to adjudi-
cate alleged unfair labor practice disputes under the National Labor
Relations Act."2 The NLRB model is an intriguing case study for a
pair of reasons.
First, at one time before the enactment of the APA, the "decisions
of NLRB hearing examiners were widely suspected of often being
skewed for policy reasons or because the examiners were under the
influence of the [agency's] enforcement unit ... ."03 The APA, once
enacted, "provided statutory insulation for hearing examiners and their
ALJ successors from pressures exerted by the agencies for which they
work."' 4 To further insulate the NLRB's ALJs from the individuals
charged with investigation and enforcement, Congress passed the Taft-
Hartley Act"0s in 1947, which removed the investigative and enforce-
ment powers from the NLRB and gave them to the Board's General
Counsel. This measure left the NLRB's ALJs with only the adjudicative
function."0 By all indications, the implementation of formal APA pro-
ceedings giving ALJs greater independence from the agency, together
with the subsequent Taft-Hartley Act measures, succeeded in quelling
the widely-held perception that the NLRB's decisionmakers were bias-
ed."ec The ITA's present poor reputation can be similarly rehabilitated
by a move to an APA-style process.
Second, the NLRB ALJs "must resolve difficult contested issues in
cases in which the parties are well-prepared and represented by coun-
sel ... [Accordingly,] the pressures on the [NLRB's] ALJs to render
101 The situation is better at the ITC, where the decisionmakers (i.e., the six commissioners
appointed to nine year terms) have much more independence than the decisionmakers at the ITA.
102 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 43-44.
i'3 ld. at 44.
70 Id. Agencies cannot rate ALJs for pay and promotion nor dismiss them. Such protections
were designed "to ensure that the determination on evidentiary facts is made impartially by an
official whom the public can see is not subject to agency influence." Id.
10 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
' FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 44.
1o3 Telephone Interview with John Truesdale, National Labor Relations Board Information
Center (July 21, 1993) (Mr. Truesdale noted that while the NLRB will always be controversial,
there are rarely any complaints about the fairness and impartiality of NLRB proceedings.).
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carefully wrought and defensible decisions are strong .... ."' Similar-
ly, antidumping proceedings in the ITA involve high economic stakes
for both foreign and domestic interests; therefore, the parties are almost
always well-prepared and represented by counsel. The difference is that
the parties in the NLRB proceeding get the benefit of "a highly formal
setting in which parties have the opportunity to cross-examine, make
motions, submit briefs . . . " and engage in other trial-like activities that
increase the likelihood that the parties will receive a fair hearing before
an impartial tribunal. 9
3. ALJs in the International Trade Commission
Adding Administrative Law Judges to the antidumping process
would not represent the first time that ALJs have been utilized in a
trade context. In particular, under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
the ITC must use an APA-style ALP" in its investigation and deter-
mination of whether there exist "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles" that destroy, substantially in-
jure, or prevent the establishment of an industry in the United
States."' ALJs are injected into the section 337 process after the Com-
mission has reviewed the petitioner's complaint and voted to initiate the
case. From that point forward, the case proceeds much like a trial in a
federal court, with the opportunity for witness cross-examination and
formal discovery such as interrogatories and depositions." 2
Why are section 337 actions subject to the APA's "on-the-record"
hearing requirements while antidumping actions are not? The legislative
history of the Trade Act of 1974 states that the "issue of the fairness of
competition raised by section 337, necessitate[s] that the Commission
'l FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 45.
109 Id.
1' The original language in the 1930 Tariff Act's section 337(c) read "[t]he testimony in
every such investigation shall be reduced to writing, and a transcript thereof with the findings
and recommendation of the commission shall be the official record ...." Section 337 was
amended by the Trade Act of 1974 to state explicitly that determinations under this section
"shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with [the
APA]. All legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(1988).
11 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). Section 337 is most often applied to intellectual property issues: that
is, infringement of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and theft of trade secrets. VAKERICS s-r AL.,
supra note 46, at 488.
"2 VAKERICS ET AL., supra note 46, at 18-19. One way in which the section 337 proceeding
does not mirror that of a trial in a federal court is that the ITC must, by statute, conclude the
case within twelve (or in some cases eighteen) months from the date of publication of the notice
of investigation in the Federal Register. Id. at 489.
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review the validity and enforceability of patents ... in accordance with
contemporary legal standards .. . .""' In comparing section 337's
legislative history with that of the antidumping provisions,1 4 it is ap-
parent that Congress considered the interests at stake in unfair trade
cases involving intellectual property matters as sufficiently important to
require formal hearings under the APA, but did not consider the inter-
ests at stake in dumping cases to be equally deserving of review "in
accordance with contemporary legal standards."".. A possible reason
for the distinction is that Congress considers section 337 actions to be
"adjudications," while it considers antidumping actions to be "investiga-
tions."" 6  Accordingly, since the APA contains provisions for
rulemaking and adjudications,"7 but not for investigations, Congress
has heretofore declined to impose APA requirements on antidumping
proceedings.
As previously discussed,"' however, there exist adequate grounds
and ample reasons for concluding that antidumping proceedings possess
the necessary adjudicative elements to justify legislation requiring that
the ITA provide APA-style hearings in antidumping cases. Such mea-
sures are necessary to assure that the parties in these high-stakes dis-
putes receive every opportunity to present their case before an impartial
tribunal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many in the international trade community believe that United
States antidumping proceedings as administered by the International
Trade Administration are patently biased and unfair. This belief is based
on the fact that the ITA does not provide the parties being investigated
an impartial tribunal. The absence of such a basic procedural safeguard,
when combined with the stunning fact that the ITA now finds fully 97%
of the foreign companies it investigates guilty of dumping, suggests that
the time has come for Congress to reevaluate the process by which
dumping allegations are investigated and decided.
This article suggests that Congress should enact legislation that
"1 S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 341 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7186, 7329 (emphasis added). "Contemporary legal standards" is apparently Congress's code for
an APA-style proceeding.
124 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
115 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
,26 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
.. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (rule making); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (adjudications).
"' See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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requires the ITA to employ Administrative Law Judges, operating under
the rubric of the Administrative Procedure Act, in its antidumping pro-
ceedings. By providing decisionmakers who are sufficiently independent
and insulated from agency influence, such a measure would in a single
stroke alleviate much of the basis for the trade community's perception
that the ITA is unfairly biased and overly vulnerable to political pres-
sure.
Besides bringing the administration of antidumping proceedings into
conformance with the very foundation upon which the U.S. legal system
is based, that is, the impartial weighing of facts and an even-handed
application of the law regardless of the circumstances of individual
cases, a measure requiring ALJs in the ITA would be good policy, since
perceptions that the agency is biased ultimately damage the United
States' own economic interests. The primary danger to U.S. interests of
such perceptions is that circumstances could escalate to the point where
U.S. trading partners retaliate and erect more onerous trade barriers of
their own, which at the least would hinder trade and punish American
exporters, and at the worst could lead to full-scale retaliatory trade wars.
In sum, the addition of ALJs to the antidumping process at the ITA
would restore a measure of integrity to an antidumping process whose
credibility for fairness has become greatly diminished in recent years, to
the point where the agency is now widely perceived as being patently
biased and unfair. By taking action to put its own house in order, and
to assure foreign producers and governments that they will receive an
impartial hearing in U.S. antidumping disputes, Congress would send the
critical message that the U.S. is committed to advancing the cause of
fair trade. This would represent an important and necessary first step in
easing the potential for a dangerous escalation of trade frictions between
the U.S. and its trading partners around the world.
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